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We study the dynamical system of expectations generated by a simple general 
equilibrium model of an exchange economy in which each agent considers a finite 
collection of models, each of which specifies a relationship between payoff-relevant 
information and equilibrium prices. One of the models under consideration is a 
correct description of the rational expectations equilibrium. We find that under a 
Bayesian type of learning process the rational expectations equilibrium is locally 
stable, but that nonrational equilibria may also be locally stable. Journal of 
Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 021, 026. 
One of the most important problems in the theory of equilibrium with 
uncertainty is the relationship between equilibrium prices and traders’ 
payoff-relevant information. The issue is: Can traders accurately forecast 
information available to others by observing only the equilibrium price? 
Such a forecast, if it exists, is a “rational expectation.” 
However, in any model of equilibrium with uncertainty, non-rational 
expectations equilibria exist. Why then are rational expectations equilibria of 
particular interest? The usual answer is, “If traders held incorrect beliefs, 
then over the course of time they would discover their error and modify their 
behavior accordingly.” In other words, over time traders learn the true 
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relationship between information and prices. Rational expectations are, so 
this argument goes, globally stable equilibria of a dynamical system whose 
laws of motion are given by specifying traders’ learning behavior. 
In this paper we test this argument. Suppose each trader considers a finite 
collection of economic models, each mapping price to a probability OR 
ivate information. One model under consideration is assumed to be the 
tional model, i.e., a model that puts probability one on the actual infor- 
mation vector associated with an equilibrium price. Given an observation of 
an equilibrium price and an information vector each trader learns by 
updating a prior distribution over models. The learning rule takes a simple 
form: the prior weight on a model is increased if and only if the model 
predicts the observed outcome better than does the “average model,” This 
learning rule would be a generalization of Bayesian learning if each trader 
had a correctly specified model of the relation between prices and infor- 
mation vectors that prevails when traders are learning. ever, the learning 
process itself affects the observed relation between p and information 
vectors so none of the models (including the rational model) need be correct 
out of equilibrium. 
The learning process that we describe can best be thought of as a boun- 
dedly rational version of Bayesian Iearning. Fully rational learning would 
require each trader to take into account the effect of his learning and the 
learning of others on equilibrium prices. However, the necessary structtue for 
such an analysis requires a degree of sophistication on the part of traders 
that seems highly implausible. 
In our boundedly rational learning structure we find that for regular 
economies, rational expectations equilibria are locally stable, and there exist 
non-rational expectations equilibria that are also locally stable. 
Our arguments are simply constructed. They depend upon finiteness of 
signals and of models, and continuity of the trader’s learning rules. 
The equilibrium model is described in Section 1. In Section 2, expectations 
are discussed. Dynamics are treated in Section 3 and examples are presented 
in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. See lume et a/. 111 for a 
discussion of the related literature. 
1. NOTATION AND AssUhlPTro~s 
We consider economies with K goods and N traders. Prices are vectors in 
the positive unit simplex AK-‘. Trader n in period t observes a signal s,,, 
drawn from a finite set S,. Let S = nt= I S, denote the set of joint signa!s. 
These signals are correlated with some payoff-relevant random variables; 
thus knowledge of other traders’ signals is payoff-relevant information for 
each trader ~ 
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Suppose that joint signal s, E S were to occur. Denote by (sJn the nth 
trader’s component of that signal. Each trader has a guess, given his own 
signal, as to the value of the joint signal, This guess can be represented by a 
probability distribution aat; an element of A#‘-‘, the positive unit simplex of 
dimension #S - 1. Denote’by a,,(s) the coordinate of a,, corresponding to 
joint signal s. We shall impose the following rationality requirement at the 
outset. Suppose that joint signal s E 5’ has occurred. Then each trader’s 
subjective beliefs about the true joint signal must satisfy a,,(~‘) > 0 implies 
(s’), = (s),. This is to say, trader N assigns probability 0 to all joint signals 
inconsistent with his own information. Let L, = Cign #Si. Let d(s,) denote 
the L, - 1 dimensional face of ,4#‘-’ whose vertices correspond to those 
joint signals for which (s’), = s,. We require that if joint signal s, occurs at 
time t, then CL,~ d((s,),) for all n. Let d(s) = flz=, d((s),), and let 
a = (a,)~= I , Q E d(s), represent the vector of all trader’s beliefs in the event 
that joint signal s occurs. 
With each joint signal s we identify an excess demand function Z,. This 
excess demand function is assumed to satisfy Walrus Law. If the excess 
demand for K - 1 goods is known, then the excess demand for the Kth good 
is known as well. Thus the excess demand function has range IRK-‘; 
2, : (Int Ax-‘) x d(s) --f F?‘. We also assume: 
A.1. Z, is bounded from below. 
A.2. For all a&A(s), if a price sequence with pi c Int AK-’ and 
pi-+p E 8AK--l, then lim inf J\Z,(p,, a)\1 > 0. 
A.3. Z, is C’ and 0 is a regular value of Z,. 
A.4. Excess demand for commodity K is bounded from below. 
Thus each Z, is very well behaved. We know that for each a E A(s) there 
exists p E Int A”-’ such that Z&p, a) = 0. Since 0 E IRK-’ is a regular value 
of Z, the graph of the equilibrium correspondence is a manifold of 
codimension K - 1 in (Int AK-‘) x A(s). It follows from the transversality 
theorem (Guilleman and Pollack [3, 68]), that for generic a E A(s), 
Z,(p, a) = 0 implies that D,Z,(p, a) is surjective. In this instance a is said to 
be a regular vector of beliefs. 
DEFINITION 1. a&A(s) is a regular vector of beliefs if Z,(p, a) = 0 
‘implies D,Z,(p, a) is surjective. 
Denote by a, E A(s) the vector of probability distributions such that each 
trader assigns probability 1 to joint signal s. 
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DEFINITION 2. A revealing rational expectations eq~ii~~ri~~ (RREE) is 
a set of prices { pS ; s E S) satisfying 
(i) Z,(p,, a,) = 0 for all s E S, 
(ii) ps =pS4 implies s = s’. 
A RREE { pS: s E S} is regular if a, is a regular vector of beliefs. Thus 
each trader can unambiguously assign probability 1 to joint signal s upon 
observing ps. Were each trader to do so and act accordingly, then excess 
demand at ps would be 0. 
Our last assumption about excess demand is 
AS. A regular RREE exists. 
The justification of this assumption depends upon the particular model 
used to derive the 2,. It is generically true, for example, in Radner’s model 
{4 1. The model that we have in mind has excess demand depending upon 
beliefs about some exogenous payoff-relevant events. These events are 
correlated with joint signals, and so if traders make use of information about 
joint signals, they can improve their guesses about the occurrence of the 
payoff-relevant events. The excess demand functions Z, are derived from 
expressing excess demand as a function of prices and beliefs about events. If 
0 is a regular value of this function, then for generic conditional probabilities 
of events given joint signals, A.5 will be true. 
2. MODELS 
In this section we consider how traders arrive at their beliefs. In brief, they 
do so by using models. Each trader observes his own signal and the 
equilibrium price vector. Using this information, the trader then forecasts 
which s has occurred. This forecast is made with a model of the re~ationsbi~ 
between (s, , p) and s. 
DEFINITION 3. A model for trader n is a function Yn: S,, x AK-’ + A 
satisfying 
(i) Ifm(s,, ~):A”-‘+A(s,), 
(ii) \Yn(sn, .) E C’. 
In a RREE there is only one price associated with each of a finite number 
of joint signals, so only a finite number of equilibrium prices are possible. 
However, during the learning process many prices other than the RREE 
price may occur for any given joint signal. Hence, models must be defined 
642/26/2-IO 
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for all feasible signal-price pairs if the boundedly rational version of 
Bayesian learning is to result in a well-defined learning rule.’ 
DEFINITION 4. Let {p, ; s E S) be a RREE. A rational model for’ trader 
rz is a model ul, such that YJ(s),,p,)(s) = 1 for all s E S. 
We denote by Y(s,p) the vector of models (YJ(s), ,p))f, 1. A vector of 
rational models has the property that Y(s,p,) = a,. 
We are not concerned with the precise relationship between models and 
equilibrium prices. Our only concern is that in a neighborhood of some 
models of particular interest the relationship is continuous. We guarantee 
this by studying models regular in a neighborhood of some equilibrium. 
Recall that a point x in the domain of a function f is a regular point if Df(x) 
is a surjective linear map from the tangent space of the domain al x to the 
tangent space of the range at f(x). 
DEFINITION 5. A vector of models Y is regular at { ps ; s E S} if, for all 
s E s, 
(i> Z,(P,, Y(s,p,)) = 0, 
(ii) each p, is a regular point of Z,(., !Y((s, e)). 
Fortunately it is easy to find regular models. Proposition 1 shows that for 
any economy satisfying A.5, any rational model is regular at the RREE. 
PROPOSITION 1. Let Y be a vector of rational models with regular 
RREE prices {p, ; s E S}. Then Y is regular at (p, ; s E S}. 
Proof. DZ,(p, Y(s, P)) = D,Z,(p, Y(s, P)) -tD,Z,(p, Y(s, P)> - D,YY(s, P). 
Choose s E 5’. 
For trader n, the coordinate of YJ(s),,p,) corresponding to joint signal s’, 
Yti((~)n, p,)(s’) is either 1 or 0 as s’ does or does not equal s. Since, for all p, 
O< Y/,((s),,p)(s’)< 1 and p,EIntdK-*, ul,((s),,p,)(s’) is either at a 
maximum or a minimum, and SO D, Yn( (s), , p,) = 0. Hence, 
DZ,(p,, Y(s,p,)) = D,Z,(p,, Y(s,p,)). But since { ps ; s E S} is a regular 
RREE, D,Z,(p,, Y(s,p,)) is surjective. Q.E.D. 
‘Although we have assumed models to be C’, it should be clear from the proofs that 
models need only be locally C’ in certain neighborhoods. 
LEARNING TO BE RATIONAL 345 
The next proposition shows that regularity is a generic property of vectors 
of models. 
PR~P~~IT~~N 2. Let p, E Int A(s) for all s E S and let each p, be a 
regular vector of beliefs. Let {p, ; s E S} be a set of prices such that 
Z,(p,, j3,) = 0 for all s E S. The set of vectors of models Y regular at 
{p, ; s E S} with Y(s,p,) =/3, is relatively open and dense in the set of a!1 
vectors of models Y with Y(s,p,) = ,6, in the topology of unl~orm C” 
convergence. 
Proof Eel H = { !f? !qs,p,) = p, f or all s E Si* We need to show for 
almost all YE H, DZ,(p,, Y(s,p,)) is surjective. DZ,(p, , !#‘(s,p,)) = 
D,Z,(p,, p,) $ D,Z,(p,, ,8,) . D, Y(s,p,). Choose s E S. Denote by A the 
(K - I) x (K - 1) matrix DpZs(psr p,), and by 63 the (K - 1) x L nmat~ix 
DBZ,(p,,p), where L = X:=1 L, - N. Let C be an e X (K - 1) matrix 
representing D, Y(s,p,) for some !P E II. Then ,(p,, !P(s,p,)) = A c 
which is (K - 1) x (K - 1). Since ,8, E Int ,4(s) there are no restrictions on 
admissible C matrices. Therefore the proposition is true if the set of 
L X (K - 1) matrices C such that A + BC has full rank K - 1 is open and 
dense. This set is obviously open. To see that this set is dense, choose 
arbitrary C and consider the function from R to R defined by p(A) = 
det(A + B(K)). The function p is evidently a polynomial, and since p(0) = 
det A f 0, p is not the degree 0 poIynomia1 identically 1 to 0. Thus it has 
only a finite number of roots. Hence if det(A + = 0, then for E. 
arbitrarily near to 1, p(a) f 0, and so there exists C itrarily near to C 
such that A +BC has full rank. QED. 
e conclude from Propositions 1 and 2 that restricting attention to 
regular models is not a particularly binding constraint. 
3. DYNAMICS 
We posit dynamics in which a trader tries to learn which of several 
models is correct. Each trader considers models !Ynl,..., 
initially a prior distribution representing his beliefs about which models are 
correct. The dynamics are as follows. Each trader begins with a vector Ano 
representing his prior distribution on the models. Ano is an element of the 
positive unit simplex A Mn- ‘. A joint signal s E S is randomly drawn, and 
each trader learns (s),. When trader n observes price vector p and signal 
(.s),~ his beliefs about s E S are given by the probability distribution 
CZL 1 L,, )unm((s>, , P). After th e market clears, traders are informed of the 
true joint signal s. They compute their posterior distributions A,, by a~~ly~~g 
a learning rule. Then the process begins again. 
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We begin by considering learning rules. 
DEFINITION 6. A learning rule for trader n is a function I, : S X AX-’ X 
A&-l + Ah-l, n 
nt= 4(St--17Pt-l~ Lt-1). 
We impose only two restrictions on learning rules. 
A.6. (i) The learning rules I,, IZ = l,..., N are continuous. 
(ii) (Likelihood Property) ,&+ I,m > Ant,,, if 
ti and 1 > A,,,,, > 0, otherwise &+ l,m = A,,,,, . 
The likelihood property requires that trader N’S confidence in model ul,,,, 
increase if and only if model Y,,, predicts the outcome in the previous period 
better than does the “average model.” For a correctly specified model, 
Bayesian updating generates a specific learning rule that satisfies A.6.’ In 
our equilibrium framework, however, the learning rule need not be 
statistically correct as the updating mechanism in A.6 may be misspecified. 
We call the learning rule boundedly rational as it applies Bayesian updating 
to models that ignore only the effect of learning itself on observations. 
We write d, = @it,..., A,,), and 
Also, let I= (2 , ,..., I,), where 2, = (1, 0 ,.,., 0), and Y, = ( !Yv,, ,..., ul,,). 
In order to specify the sequence of temporary equilibria that obtain, we 
need to specify how the equilibrium prices vary with 1. All we require is 
some continuity, which comes from regularity properties of the models. 
PROPOSITION 3. Let models Y, 1 ,..., YN, be regular at prices {ps ; s E S}. 
Also let Y12,..., YNMN be any other models. Then for each s E S there exists 
an E, > 0 and a function g, : nF= 1 AM,-’ -+ AK-’ such that 
(i) g, is Cl on {A: I/l-111 < e,}, 
(ii) Z,(g,(A>, 2) = 0 f /IA - 111 < Es, 
(iii) g,(X) = ps . 
‘Specifically, posterior beliefs about any model will be more favorable than prior beliefs if 
and only if the model outperforms the average and if prior beliefs were not such that the 
model was surely correct or surely false. The likelihood property can be modified by deleting 
the condition &, > 0 without affecting our results. 
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Pro@ DZ,(p,, 1) = [D,Z,(p,, 1) D,Z,(p,, A)]. At A = 2, B,Z,(pS, 2) = 
DZ,(p,, ~l(s,p,)). Since the vector of models P’, is regular at { pS ; s E S\r 
D,Z,(p,, A) is surjective. The proposition now follows from the irn~~~c~t 
function theorem. Q.E.D. 
The formal specification of the dynamical system under consideration is 
(*I J”t+ 1 = +,3 &1(4)7 &>Y where &+, = Jn(Sp &,(&>~ J-,,); n = L..., N, 
and the domain of definition is the intersection of the domains of definition 
of the g,. We give sufficient conditions for ?L to be a locally stable stationary 
point of (*), and then apply this condition to rational models. 
THEOREM 1. Let (ul,,, Iz = I,..., N, m = l,...,M,) be a cdection f$ 
models with the following properties: 
(i) the vector of models !PI is regular al prices { p, ; s E S), 
69 YdWn~ P,>(S) > Yds),~ P,)(S) for all 
a? = I,..., IV; and s E S. 
Then 2 is a locally stable rest point of (*>. 
The intuition behind the proof is illustrated in Fig. 1. Trader n is choosing 
between models !Py,, and !Py,,. If At is sufficiently near X, then g,(A,) will be 
near enough to P, so that ~J(s>~, g,(L)>(s) > u/n2i(sL7 g,@,>>(s>. The 
likelihood property then implies that An,t+I,l > A,,,. If this is the situation 
for all n and all SES, then /Ix-./2_,Il>IIx-A,+.Ij/. Continuity of the 
functions I, then imply that lim,,, A, = IL. 
FIGURE 1 
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This theorem relies on the assumption that each agent has a finite signal 
set and considers only a finite number of models. Whether or not a similar 
result would hold with a continuum is an open question. Bray [2] has 
demonstrated stability of the rational model with a continuum in a specific 
partial equilibrium model with linear supply and demand functions. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Take as a norm for nf=, dMX-’ the I, norm 
/Ia-a’Il=C~==,C~,la,,-a~,(. F rom Proposition 3 and the continuity 
of the Y,,, and the hypotheses of the theorem, there exists an E > 0 such that 
if /j;i - &(I < E, then for all s E Sg,(&) is continuous and for all n = I,..., N 
and m = 2,..., Mn, Yn~(I((s>n, g,(U)(s) > ul,,((s>,~ g,@,))(s). Now llj -All = 
2 Cz=, (1 -&). The likelihood property implies that /in,t+l,l > A,,, for all 
N = l,..., N and s E S. Thus 111 -A,+, /) < 11x -A,//. 
Let 6, = /lx - &]I. Then 0 < 6, < E and {S,}z, is a decreasing sequence. 
Hence it has a limit 8. Suppose 8 > 0. Then the sequence {&} has a limit 
set A with 2 E A implying that (II- d(( = 8 > 0. But if )\A - /1)/= 8 > 0, 
then 112 - Z(s, g,(A), a)ll = 2 CF= 1 (1 - Q, g,(a), a>,,) < 2 Cr= 1 (1 -U = 
112 - /2/l= 6, by the likelihood property. Thus /z cannot be in A, and so 
A =@. Thus 6,-+0, and so 2,--+x. Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY 1. Let Yy, = (Yy,, ,..., Y,,) be a vector of rational models 
with regular RREE prices {p,; s E S}. Let Y,,,, n = l,..., N, m = 2 ,..., M: be 
any other models with the property that Ynm((s), ,p,)(s) < 1. Then A is 
IocalJy stable. 
Proof: It is easy to see that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied. 
Q.E.D. 
It is easy to construct examples using Theorem 1 for which, even though 
traders may be considering rational models, a non-rational model is locally 
stable. 
COROLLARY 2. Let o(s) be a permutation of S such that o(s) # s for all 
s E S. Suppose that M, = 2 for all n and that !Pz is a vector of models with 
RREE prices { ps : s E SJ. If there exists a vector of models Y, regular at 
1 PO(S) ; s E Sl and for which ~,,I((~>,,, p,,&(s) > YA(s), 9 p,(,,)(s) for all 
s E S, then 1 is locally stable. 
Proof. Again, the conditions of Theorem 1 are easily seen to be 
satisfied. Q.E.D. 
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4. EXAMPLES 
Since the hypothesis of rationality ties down the prediction of a model 
only at the RREE prices it is easy to construct examples in which a rational 
model is locaily stable, a non-rational model is locally stable, or cycles may 
occur. Such an example may he constructed using the utiiity functions. and 
endowments from Radner’s example 141 of the existence of RREE. In this 
example there are two types of traders; informed traders who all receive a 
signal s = 1 or 2 and uninformed traders who receive no signal. Suppose the 
uninformed traders are choosing between a rational mode: IV, and a non- 
rational model !P* as illustrated in Fig. 2. Whether I= (I9 0) or 2 = (0, I) is 
locally stable or cycles occur depends on the relationship between /3, a and l;~ 
Let A, be the uninformed traders weight on !PI. If: 
(i) p > E > q then 1 is locally stable. 
(ii) q > s > j3 then x is locally stable. 
If d, > 0 and sufficiently less than 1: 
(iii) F: > j3 and E > q then if signal 1 occurs it,+, > Ai and if signs! 2 
occurs a,,, < At. 
owr?; p > 
E and q > tr then if signal 1 occurs R,, I < il, and if signaf 2 
ffl > 4. 
Hence, we can have the rational model locally stable, the nob-rational 
model locally stable, or cycles (by a suitable choice of a stochastic process 
on signals and a learning rule). 
In this example, where all uninformed traders consider the same set of 
models (Y, and Y,), if j3 > E > q then beliefs converge to a non-rational 
model. At this point all uninformed traders have “‘learned” !Pz. but Yz is 
I I P 
PI 91 92 PZ 
FIGURE 2 
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systematically wrong. For example, when s = 1 occurs q1 always results but 
Y2 puts probability p < 1 on this event (see Fig. 1). It could be argued that 
traders should recognize this error and modify their behavior. The obvious 
modification is to include a method of hypothesis testing and model revision 
in the learning rule. This modification is not included in our analysis as it 
raises numerous conceptual and technical questions. In particular, the 
observed relation between prices and signals will not persist if traders 
somehow consider a new model (i.e., one other than Iv, or YJ. So there 
seems to be no obvious way to correctly revise a model. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has two results: a local stability theorem for rational models 
and also a global instability theorem. The learning process may get stuck at 
an incorrect model because all of the admissible models are incorrect away 
from the RREE. No model tries to forecast the expectations of other traders, 
and so the set of admissible models is too small to describe the full behavior 
of the economy. Whether enlarging the set of admissible models-in 
particular, by admitting richer models that estimate the expectations of other 
traders-will eliminate stable non-rational models is an open question. 
With the finite collection of models treated in this paper there does exist a 
trivial learning rule which gives almost sure convergence to a RREE. 
Suppose that at date 1 each trader arbitrarily chooses a model and acts as if 
he believes this model to be correct. Each trader continues to use this model 
until it gives a prediction which is incorrect. 3 When a trader decides that his 
model is incorrect, he randomly chooses another model from his finite set of 
models. With probability 1 there exists t < cc such that at I each trader is 
using model Ynu,, . Then each U,, predicts correctly and so no trader will 
abandon it. 
We have two objections to this learning mechanism. First, it is not at all 
related to anything that statistical decision theory might suggest. The 
learning models of Section 3 arise from Bayesian learning with incorrectly 
specified conditional distributions. The learning model we have just 
described has no trace of rationality attached to it. For example, traders will 
often reject models that are only slightly incorrect in favor of models that are 
abominably wrong. Second, the nice behavior of this rule is a clear artifact 
of the finiteness of the model. 
31n the case where a model predicts a distribution of states, each trader might do a 
hypothesis test based on the empirical distribution of states at a given price and switch models 
only when the null hypothesis (that the model is correct) is rejected. The Glivent*Cantelli 
Theorem and the corresponding ZLT can be used to show that such models will ultimately be 
rejected. 
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